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Holding Out for a Change: Why North Carolina Should Permit
Holder Claims*
INTRODUCTION

Securities have been regulated for many years and continue to be
subject to changing rules.' Despite extensive securities regulations, a
gap still exists in North Carolina that prevents adequate relief for
individual securities holders who have suffered losses based on
misrepresentations by a corporation's officers or directors. A prime
example of this gap was recently before the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Estate of Browne v. Thompson.2 This case involved seven

individual plaintiffs who owned and retained shares of Wachovia
Corporation ("Wachovia") stock during a period of large financial
losses in which officers filed false reports with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and withheld other material
information from shareholders.' When information regarding
Wachovia's financial decline finally came to light, the plaintiffs' stock
plummeted in value.'
Had the plaintiffs in this case been induced to buy new shares of
stock or sell shares that they owned based on the officers' and
directors' misrepresentations, they would have had recourse in their
individual capacities under SEC Rule lOb-5. 5 Instead, because the
plaintiffs were "holders" who retained stock that they already owned,
there was no avenue for individual relief even though the plaintiffs
suffered financial loss as a result of the defendants'
misrepresentations.'
* @2014 Lauren A. Demanovich.
1. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. H§ 77a-77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)). Within the past 20 years,
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)), and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)), have been enacted to control the number of and
fora for securities actions that shareholders may bring.
2.

-

N.C. App. -,

727 S.E.2d 573 (2012).

3. See Complaint at 1-2, Browne v. Thompson, No. 09 CVS 8588, 2011 WL 1675000
(N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), 2009 WL 8631784, at *1.
4. Id.
5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
6. See Estate of Browne, - N.C. App. at -, 727 S.E.2d at 575-76. As will be
discussed in Part II, a derivative suit brought by the shareholders on behalf of the
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There are two primary reasons behind the lack of an individual
remedy for the plaintiffs in Estate of Browne and similar cases:
(1) federal law places restrictions on the securities claims that may be
brought;' and (2) North Carolina does not recognize holder claims,
which are claims for damages based on the idea that a defendant's
misrepresentation caused a shareholder to "hold" onto his or her
stock when the shareholder would have otherwise sold the stock.'
This Recent Development argues that North Carolina should
recognize holder claims and provide a legal remedy for shareholders
who suffer financial losses because they retained their stock after
relying on misrepresentations by corporate directors or officers.
However, like other states, North Carolina should limit holder claims
by adopting heightened pleading requirements. Such pleading
requirements balance the interests of corporations and courts-who
seek to avoid frivolous litigation-with the interests of shareholderswho aim to recoup losses induced by misrepresentation and
encourage ethical actions of corporate officers and directors.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the facts of Estate
of Browne v. Thompson. Next, Part II discusses the minimal avenues
of recourse currently available to shareholders under North Carolina
law, as well as the limitations that exist under federal law. Part III
discusses how other states have addressed the issue of holder claims,
particularly focusing on the limitations and heightened pleading
requirements imposed in California, a state that allows holder claims.
Finally, Part IV argues that North Carolina should follow the lead of
states like California by permitting limited holder claims. Doing so
would advance the interests of shareholders by allowing for the
possibility of an additional remedy not presently available while still
sparing courts and corporations from an influx of meritless litigation.
I. ESTATE OF BROWNE V. THOMPSON

In 2012, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided Estate of
Browne v. Thompson, a case brought by shareholders of Wachovia. 9
The shareholders' Wachovia stock plummeted in value following the
corporation's acquisition of Golden West Financial Corporation

corporation would have been possible; however, the court of appeals did not permit a
direct, individual suit to be brought under these facts.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See Estate of Browne,

_

N.C. App. at

_,

727 S.E.2d at 576; infra note 25 and

accompanying text.
9. Estate of Browne, _ N.C. App. at

_,

727 S.E.2d at 574.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

990

[Vol. 92

("Golden West")." Golden West had issued loans to borrowers
without adequately checking the creditworthiness of those borrowers,
using underwriting standards that the Estate of Browne plaintiffs
claimed were "'risky' and insufficient to determine adequately the
creditworthiness of borrowers."" After being acquired by Wachovia,
Golden West's "risky" underwriting practices backfired in light of the
rapid deterioration of the national housing market during the mid2000s. As a result, Wachovia experienced "unprecedented losses"
from 2006 to 2008.12

Seven individual shareholders directly sued Wachovia,
Wachovia's successor Wells Fargo & Company ("Wells Fargo"),
Wachovia's auditor KPMG LLP, and the former Wachovia directors
who served during the time of the Golden West acquisition and the
subsequent drop in Wachovia's stock price." The shareholders
claimed that the former directors "concealed information regarding
underwriting standards, collateral quality, and necessary reserves for
loans" and also "issued false public SEC filings, press releases, and
earnings calls regarding Wachovia's financial strength and stability"
from the time of the Golden West acquisition in 2006 until September
2008, when Wachovia merged with Wells Fargo.14 The shareholders
argued that they relied on the former directors' misrepresentations
when they made the choice to continue holding their Wachovia
stock."
The plaintiffs' suit was dismissed by the North Carolina Business
Court,16 and the North Carolina Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed
10. Id. at

_,

727 S.E.2d at 574-75.

11. Browne v. Thompson, No. 09 CVS 8588, 2011 WL 1675000, at *1-2 (N.C. Bus. Ct.
Feb. 23, 2011), affd sub nom. Estate of Browne v. Thompson, - N.C. App. -, 727 S.E.2d
573 (2012). In addition to the riskiness of the borrowers, the loans offered by Golden
West, known as "Pick A Pay" loans, had the potential to result in negative amortization,
"meaning the principal balance of the loan increases, rather than decreases," if borrowers
only paid the minimum payment due each month. Id. at *1. The court noted, "[N]egative
amortization could cause a borrower to owe more than the property is worth." Id.
12. Id. at *2.
13. Estate of Browne, _ N.C. App. at , 727 S.E.2d at 574-75.
14. Id. at -, 727 S.E.2d at 575. By the time of the merger, Wachovia's stock was
worth less than one dollar per share. Id. Wachovia shareholders were given only 0.1991
shares of Wells Fargo stock for each share of Wachovia stock they had when the merger
occurred. Id.
15. See id.
16. See Browne, 2011 WL 1675000, at *5, *8. The North Carolina Business Court is a
specialized trial-level state court tasked by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina with overseeing "[c]ases involving complex and significant issues of
corporate and commercial law."
About the Court, N.C. BUS. COURT,
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/New/aboutcourt/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Specifically,
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the Business Court's dismissal." The court of appeals first discussed
the general rule in North Carolina that "shareholders cannot pursue
individual causes of action" when the value of their stock is harmed."s
Rather, shareholders can typically only pursue derivative actions,
which are actions brought by shareholders in their capacity as
representatives of the corporation against directors, officers, or others
whose frauds or misrepresentations cause harm to the value of the
corporation.19 In derivative suits, any damages awarded by the court
go to the corporation rather than directly into the pockets of any
individual shareholders.20
Judge Steelman's majority opinion in Estate of Browne discussed
two exceptions to the general rule that shareholders can only bring
derivative actions. Established in the case of Barger v. McCoy Hillard
& Parks2 1 and known as Barger exceptions, North Carolina allows
shareholders to bring individual causes of action if (1) the defendant
owed a special duty to the shareholder or (2) the shareholder suffered
a different injury than the other shareholders.22 The court of appeals
in Estate of Browne ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs did not
fall into either exception, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not bring
the suit in their individual capacities.23 Without the ability to bring
suit in their individual capacities or claim an individual remedy in a
the North Carolina Business Court can hear cases pertaining to securities law, antitrust
law, intellectual property law, and other subjects deemed by statute to constitute a
"mandatory complex business case." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(a) (2013). Parties to cases
involving such subject matters may remove from superior court to the North Carolina
Business Court by filing a Notice of Designation with the local superior court, the Senior
Business Court Judge, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and all
other parties to the case. Id. § 7A-45.4(b). If any other party believes that a case should
not be considered a "mandatory complex business case" under the statute, it may file an
opposition within thirty days of receiving the Notice of Designation. Id. § 7A-45.4(e). In
addition to subjects deemed by statute to be "mandatory complex business cases,"
superior court judges also have the discretion to recommend that cases be designated
"complex business cases" or "exceptional cases" and heard by the North Carolina
Business Court. See Memorandum from Supreme Court of N.C. Chief Justice I. Beverly
Lake, Jr. to Superior Court Judges 2 (Mar. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/New/links/CJ%20Guidelines%203%2007%2001.pdf. This
recommendation can be made at the request of the parties or on the judge's own motion,
and judges may make this recommendation over a party's objection. See id.
17. See Estate of Browne, _ N.C. App. at , 727 S.E.2d at 574.
18. Id. at -, 727 S.E.2d. at 575 (quoting Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C.
650, 658, 488 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1997)).
19. See JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW
§ 15.2 (3d ed. 2011).
20. See id.
21. 346 N.C. 650, 488 S.E.2d 215 (1997).
22. See id. at 658, 488 S.E.2d at 219.
23. Estate of Browne, -

N.C. App. at

_,

727 S.E.2d at 575-76.
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derivative suit, the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to
damages through a holder claim. 24 A holder claim is a suit brought for
damages based on the fact that an individual shareholder suffered
financial loss after retaining stock for longer than he or she otherwise
would have as a consequence of an officer's or director's
misrepresentation. 25 The plaintiffs in Estate of Browne argued that
North Carolina case law had previously recognized holder claims in
the case of Gilbert v. Bagley26 and that the court should do so again in
this instance.27 In Gilbert, the federal district court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, relying on section 55-35 of the North
Carolina General Statutes 28 and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's decision in Underwood v. Stafford,29 determined that
shareholders have an individual cause of action against officers and
directors who violate their fiduciary duties to shareholders."o The
Gilbert court highlighted that "[t]he shareholder plaintiffs' injury, i.e.,
inducement to either hold or purchase shares in the Company as a
result of the alleged scheme, is peculiar to them" and thus constitutes
an individual, rather than a derivative, cause of action.31 However, the
Estate of Browne court noted that the statute relied upon by the
24. Id. at _, 727 S.E.2d at 576.

25. See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1256-57 (Cal. 2003) (defining a "holder's
action" as "a cause of action by persons wrongfully induced to hold stock instead of selling
it."); Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS 25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *11 (N.C. Bus.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2011) ("A claim for damages suffered by shareholders who ... allege that they
decided not to sell their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure to
disclose unfavorable material, after which there was a fall in the stock's value, is known as
a 'holder claim.' "); Robert W. Taylor, Note, Re-evaluating Holder Actions: Giving
Defrauded Securities Holders a FightingChance, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 413,415 (2011)
(citing Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 490 F.
Supp. 2d 784, 787 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 2007)).
26. 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
27. See Plaintiffs Response to the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants G. Kennedy
Thompson, Thomas J. Wurtz, Donald K. Truslow, Robert K. Steel, Wachovia
Corporation, and Wells Fargo & Company (as Successor-In-Interest to Wachovia
Corporation) and to the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant KPMG, LLP at 7, Browne v.
Thompson, No. 09 CVS 8588, 2011 WL 1675000 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011) (citing
Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 734 (M.D.N.C. 1980)). In addition to Gilbert, the
plaintiffs relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in Small to argue in support of
recognition of holder claims in this particular case. See id. at 11-12. For a discussion of the
holding and rationale in Small, see infra Part III.B.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (Supp. 1979), supersededby Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265,
§ 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 516, 615-16 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (2013)).
29. 270 N.C. 700, 155 S.E.2d 211 (1967).
30. See Gilbert, 492 F. Supp. at 733-35 ("There are ... allegations that the Company's
officers and directors caused or permitted certain false or misleading financial reports to
be published. This, too, presents an individual claim.").
31. See id. at 734 (emphasis added).
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Gilbert court had since been superseded.32 In superseding the statute,
the North Carolina General Assembly removed the duty that runs

from the board of directors to the shareholders.33 Thus, the court of
appeals rejected the Estate of Browne plaintiffs' arguments and
concluded that North Carolina law does not recognize holder claims.'
II. LIMITATIONS ON HOLDER CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL AND NORTH
CAROLINA LAW

There are numerous laws relevant to regulating securities and
defining appropriate causes of action for injured shareholders." This
Part demonstrates how securities regulations and the federal and
state courts' narrow interpretations of such regulations have limited
the availability of holder claims for injured shareholders in North
Carolina.
A.

Narrow Interpretationsof Federal Securities Regulations

Among federal regulations, SEC Rule 10b-5 is the most pertinent
to Estate of Browne and similar cases that involve fraud or
misrepresentation concerning securities. The SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5 to allow an investor to sue another person for fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or material omission "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."36
32. See Estate of Browne v. Thompson,

-

N.C. App.

_

_,

727 S.E.2d 573, 576

(2012) ("Gilbert relies on the premises that officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to
shareholders and that such duty is directly actionable by individual shareholders. In 1989,
the General Assembly amended the statutes governing corporations, eliminating the
provision that the directors' duty runs to both the shareholders and the corporation. 'The
drafters [of N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-8-30] recognized that directors have a duty to act for the
benefit of all the shareholders of the corporation, but they intended to avoid stating a duty
owed directly by the directors to the shareholders that might be construed to give
shareholders a direct right of action on claims that should be asserted derivatively.' "
(quoting RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW § 14.01[21 (7th ed. 2012))).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 19, § 27.5, at 734 (discussing various statutes
including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also
infra Part II.B (discussing PSLRA and SLUSA).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). This rule provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,37 the United States
Supreme Court clarified that SEC Rule 10b-5's requirement that the
injury occur "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
meant that only actual buyers or sellers of securities could bring suit
under the rule.38 Such an interpretation means that would-be sellersindividuals who retained securities which they would have sold but
for the misrepresentation-and would-be buyers-individuals who
would have purchased securities but for the misrepresentation-fall
outside of the protections of SEC Rule 10b-5.39 A would-be seller is
termed a "holder," and his or her claim for damages suffered after
retaining securities in reliance on an officer's or director's
misrepresentation is known as a "holder claim" or "holder's action."40
For the Blue Chip Stamps Court, the key arguments against
allowing would-be buyers or would-be sellers to bring suit under SEC
Rule 10b-5 were the "danger of vexatious litigation" and "the
potential for nuisance or 'strike' suits."41 "Vexatious litigation" or
" 'strike' suits" could lead to a number of problems, including: (1)
delays of regular business operations; (2) "possible abuse of the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure";
and (3) pressure on corporations to settle frivolous, non-meritorious
claims in an attempt to avoid the hassle and expense of litigation.42
The Blue Chip Stamps Court was also concerned with the weak
degree of proof that may be involved if would-be buyers or sellers
were permitted to bring claims under SEC Rule 10b-5, noting that a
"[p]laintiff's entire testimony could be dependent upon

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
37. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
38. See id. at 730-31.
39. See id. at 730-31, 737-38.
40. See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1256-57 (Cal. 2003) (defining a "holder's
action" as "a cause of action by persons wrongfully induced to hold stock instead of selling
it."); see also Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS 25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *11 (N.C.
Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011) ("A claim for damages suffered by shareholders who ... allege that
they decided not to sell their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure
to disclose unfavorable material, after which there was a fall in the stock's value, is known
as a 'holder claim.' "); Taylor, supra note 25, at 415 (defining holder claims as "actions
where the shareholder-plaintiff alleges that the defendant's misrepresentation induced
him to continue holding his stock when he would have otherwise purchased or sold and
seeks to recover for the diminished value of the stock suffered as a result").
41. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.
42. Id. at 740-41.
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uncorroborated oral evidence of many of the crucial elements of his
claim, and still be sufficient to go to the jury."43
In a case like Estate of Browne, where the plaintiffs were not
actual sellers but instead would-be sellers, the requirements under
SEC Rule 10b-5 and Blue Chip Stamps mean that there is no cause of
action under federal law for a plaintiff bringing suit in his or her
individual capacity. But SEC Rule 10b-5 is not necessarily the end of
the road for a would-be seller. As discussed below, states also provide
causes of action with regard to securities fraud," and some states
permit far broader relief than is available under Rule 10b-5, including
causes of action for holder claims brought by would-be sellers.45
B.

Recent Federal Statutory Limitations on State Holder Claims

Federal statutes have also placed significant limitations on state
law securities actions. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")" in order to "deter[] frivolous and
burdensome securities litigation" by "enact[ing] a number of reforms,
including heightened pleading requirements and mandatory stays of
discovery" for securities claims brought in federal court.47 Thus,
plaintiffs began bringing claims in state court to avoid the restrictions
and added pleading requirements of PSLRA.48 In response, Congress
passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA")
in 1998.49 SLUSA allows state class action suits that involve fifty or
more plaintiffs and that are brought "in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security" to be removed to federal court.o
Because SLUSA does not allow federal courts to hear securitiesrelated class action suits that are based in state or common law, all the

43. Id. at 746.
44. See infra Parts II.C, III.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
47. Bruce A. Ericson & Robert B. Bader, Using Dabit, the Supreme Court Plugs a
Gap in FederalSecurities Laws to Preempt "Holder" State Law Class Action Claims, SEC.
LITIG. REP., June 2006, at 9.
48. See id.
49. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)); see Ericson &
Bader, supra note 47, at 9 (identifying the reduction of shareholder class actions as one of
Congress's intentions in enacting SLUSA).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2012).
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cases that defendants remove to federal courts are ultimately
dismissed."
While the initial ambiguity over whether the "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security" language in SLUSA was
intended to include holder claims sparked a circuit split,5 2 the United
States Supreme Court resolved the issue in 2006 with its decision in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit.53 The plaintiff-

respondent in Dabit argued that the "in connection with" language of
SLUSA should be construed narrowly to refer only to the same types
of claims that are allowed under SEC Rule 10b-5's "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" language54 and thus not
extend to holder claims. 5 Such an interpretation would have the
effect of exempting state holder claim class action suits with over fifty
plaintiffs from removal and subsequent dismissal.56 But the Dabit
Court disagreed, concluding that the language of SLUSA does indeed
cover holder claims.
In sum, there is no federally recognized holder claim since SEC
Rule 10b-5 provides relief only for actual buyers or sellers of
securities, not would-be sellers. If state law does happen to permit
holder claims, SLUSA allows for a defendant to remove a class action
suit involving fifty or more plaintiffs to federal court, where-if the
class action is premised on a holder claim-the case will be
dismissed.
51. See, e.g., Prager v. Knight/Trimark Grp., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231-32, 235
(D.N.J. 2000) (finding that, because SLUSA applied to the plaintiff's claim, the
defendant's removal of the claim to federal court was proper and that dismissal of such
claim was also proper); Lasley v. New England Variable Life Ins. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same); see also Ericson & Bader, supra note 47, at 9
("Because SLUSA prohibits class actions based on state or common law, such actions,
once removed to federal court, are subject to immediate dismissal.").
52. See Ericson & Bader, supra note 47, at 9 ("SLUSA does not define the phrase 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.' . . . The Second, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits each interpreted SLUSA to cover only sellers and purchasers of
securities, and not holders. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, rejected attempts by
plaintiffs to plead around the 'in connection with' language by limiting their classes to
holders of securities.").
53. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
54. See supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text.
55. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 84.
56. See Matthew D. Haydo, Recent Decision, A Class Action Securities Fraud Claim
Brought Under State Law by Holders of Securities Is Preempted by a Federal Act
Purportingto Encompass Claims Brought by Purchasersand Sellers: Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 45 DuQ. L. REV. 325, 326-27 (2007).
57. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 82-88.
58. See supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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North CarolinaState Law Limitations

While SLUSA limits a party's ability to bring a securities claim in
state court by authorizing removal in many circumstances, individuals
and classes of forty-nine or fewer plaintiffs can still bring securities
actions under state law since SLUSA applies only to classes of fifty or
more plaintiffs.60 Despite the federal restrictions, this means it is still
possible to bring a holder claim if the laws of a given state recognize
such a cause of action. Although SLUSA is quite limiting, it does not
totally preclude holder claims under state law. The facts underlying
Estate of Browne offer a prime example of a holder claim proceeding
in state court without SLUSA removing the case to federal court,
given that the suit was brought by only seven shareholders.61
Therefore, it is still essential to consider what causes of action or
limitations exist under the laws of a given state.
In North Carolina, the remedies available to individual
shareholders who suffer financial losses are fairly limited.62 Instead of
allowing a direct suit brought by a shareholder in his or her individual
capacity, North Carolina courts generally allow shareholders only to
bring derivative actions against directors or officers who are engaging
in fraud, misrepresentation, or otherwise harming the corporation.
A derivative action is a claim brought in the name of a corporation
that is intended to benefit the corporation rather than the individual
shareholder who brings the suit.' Presumably, a (rational)
shareholder would bring suit directly as opposed to derivatively, since
''recoveries in derivative actions generally accrue to the corporation,"
which only indirectly benefits the harmed shareholders. 5 North
Carolina courts have justified this preference for derivative rather
than direct suits on multiple grounds. First, creditors' superior rights
to the corporation's funds could be adversely impacted by direct
suits.66 Second, directors do not owe a direct duty to each individual
60. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
_, 727 S.E.2d 573, 574
61. See Estate of Browne v. Thompson, - N.C. App.
(2012).
62. See id at _, 727 S.E.2d at 575 ("The well-established general rule is that
shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or
injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their
stock." (quoting Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 345 N.C. 650, 658, 488 S.E.2d 215, 219
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. See id. For a discussion of the Barger exceptions, see infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
64. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 19, § 15.2, at 443.
65. See id. at 444.
66. See Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS 25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *6 (N.C.
Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011).
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shareholder, but rather, they owe this duty to the corporation.6 7
Third, allowing individual claims could result in a flood of litigation.6 8
As noted previously, North Carolina has two exceptions, known
as Barger exceptions, to its mandate requiring shareholders to sue
derivatively.' The first of these exceptions-the "special duty"
exception-applies "when the [defendant] performed individualized
services directly for the shareholder" or "undertook to advise
shareholders independently of the corporation," among other
instances. 70 The second exception-the "separate and distinct injury"
exception-is more rare, and examples of events that may satisfy the
second Barger exception are sparse.7 ' However, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals determined that the exception applied in Norman v.
Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc.,72 a case where the minority
shareholders of a closely held corporation suffered a separate injury
from the majority shareholders of the corporation after the majority
shareholders took business opportunities for themselves at the
expense of the corporation.
Outside of the two Barger exceptions, North Carolina provides
no avenue for direct, individual shareholder action in response to
fraudulent actions by directors or officers. North Carolina does not
permit holder claims, as other states do,74 and North Carolina courts
have expressed reservations about permitting holder claims. For
example, echoing concerns similar to those expressed by the Blue
Chip Stamps Court," the North Carolina Business Court recently
67. See Estate of Browne,

N.C. App at -, 727 S.E.2d at 576 (citing RUSSELL M.
§ 14.01[2] (7th ed.
2012)). Though the directors do not owe a direct duty to each individual shareholder, they
do "have a duty to act for the benefit of all shareholders of the corporation." Id.
68. See Harris,2011 WL 1679625, at *6.
69. See Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 345 N.C. 650, 658, 488 S.E.2d 215, 219
(1997); supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
70. Barger, 345 N.C. at 659, 488 S.E.2d at 220.
71. The Barger opinion simply stated a qualifying injury would have to be "separate
and distinct from any damage suffered by the corporation," without elaborating. Id.
(quoting Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C. App. 488, 492, 272 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1980) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Other opinions considering the second Barger exception have
concluded that the exception was not met, without providing any specific description of
what might satisfy the exception. See, e.g., Energy Investors Fund v. Metric Constructors,
Inc., 351 N.C. 331, 335-36, 525 S.E.2d 441, 444 (2000); Gaskin v. J.S. Proctor Co., 196 N.C.
App. 447, 457-58, 675 S.E.2d 115, 121 (2009); Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 328, 506
S.E.2d 875, 881 (2002) (Greene, J., concurring).
72. 140 N.C. App. 390, 537 S.E.2d 248 (2000).
73. See id. at 408, 573 S.E.2d at 260-61.
74. See infra Part III (discussing states that permit holder claims).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
-
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stated that "holder claims present substantive difficulties with regard
to the elements of causation and damages in that by definition they
are of a speculative nature that relies upon subjective and selfinterested testimony."7 6 Similarly, the North Carolina Business Court
criticized holder claims by noting that a remedy for an individual
plaintiff would come "at the expense of other shareholders similarly
situated."" The court recognized that a successful holder claim action
would require the corporation to pay damages to the shareholder
bringing the suit, reducing the benefit payable to other shareholders
who also suffered from the misrepresentations.
In sum, an individual wishing to pursue a holder claim action
faces a number of limitations. First, no federal law authorizes an
action for holder claims, since the primary legal remedy for
individuals-SEC Rule 10b-5-does not extend to holders or "wouldbe sellers" of stock who suffer losses. Second, to the extent that
controlling state law permits holder claims, SLUSA limits potential
remedial avenues by mandating that class action suits with fifty or
more plaintiffs be removed to federal court where they will
subsequently be dismissed. Finally, for an individual shareholder in
North Carolina, there is no legal remedy at the state level for typical
holder claims. This is a severe limitation on potential holder claims,
allowing only holders falling in one of the narrow Barger exceptions
to pursue an individual legal remedy.
III. HOLDER CLAIMS IN OTHER STATES
To be sure, North Carolina is not alone in rejecting holder
claims.79 Nonetheless, courts in other states have recognized holder
claims,o and this Part focuses on case law from two states in
76. Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS 25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *12 (N.C. Bus.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2011).
77. Id. at *11.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Arnlund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 199 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. Va. 2002);
Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ.A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6,
2002); see also Harris, 2011 WL 1679625, at *11 (citing cases from other states in support
of the contention that other jurisdictions do not allow for holder claims).
80. In addition to New York and California, which are discussed in detail in this Part,
other states, including Georgia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, have recognized holder
claims. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grubman, 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (Ga. 2010); Reisman v. KPMG
Peat Marwick LLP, 787 N.E.2d 1060, 1068 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Duffy v. Smith, 32 A.
371, 372 (N.J. 1895); see also Samuel T. Brannan, Arguments and Authorities Supporting
the Viability of Holder Claims, PIABA B.J., Summer 2006, at 49 (arguing that holder
claims have long been recognized in the common law of some states and the rules of some
industries).
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particular-New York and California. New York case law illustrates
that New York courts have long recognized holder claims as valid
actions. In addition, California provides a useful demonstration of
how courts have judicially refined holder claims over time to respond
to critiques of holder claims originally leveled by the Blue Chip
Stamps Court."
A.

New York

New York has recognized holder claims since the 1927 case of
82
ContinentalInsuranceCo. v. Mercadante.
In that case, the defendant

made misrepresentations regarding the solvency of a company in
which the plaintiffs had purchased bonds.8 3 These misrepresentations
encouraged the plaintiffs to retain the bonds, which ultimately
became "substantially worthless."' The plaintiffs claimed that, had
they been aware of the actual financial condition of the company,
they would have sold the bonds." Though the Mercadante court did
not use the term "holder claim," the description of the facts of the
case indicate that the underlying issue in Mercadante is the same as
what would now be considered a "holder claim."86 The Mercadante
court highlighted the impact of the misrepresentation on the harmed
shareholders, specifically noting that "[s]o far as respects the owner of
property, his change of conduct [because of the fraud or
misrepresentation] between keeping the property on the one hand,
and selling it, on the other, is equally great."87
Similar to the plaintiffs in Estate of Browne, then, the plaintiff in
Mercadante altered his originally intended course of action because of
fraud or misrepresentation and suffered a loss. The following
hypothetical illustrates the radically different treatment under North
Carolina law. Recall that Browne and his six co-plaintiffs stated that
they decided to continue to hold onto their Wachovia stock in
reliance on SEC filings, press releases, and other statements of the
corporation which contained fraudulent information." Assuming that
81. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (discussing the critiques made by the
Blue Chip Stamps Court).
82. 225 N.Y.S. 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
83. See id. at 489-90.
84. Id. at 490.
85. See id.
86. See id. ("The gravamen of the action is for fraud in inducing, not the purchase of
the bonds, but their retention after purchase.").
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See Estate of Browne v. Thompson,

(2012).

-

N.C. App.

,

_, 727 S.E.2d 573, 575
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the Estate of Browne plaintiffs' allegations were true, they made the
decision to retain their shares of Wachovia stock because of the
falsely positive reports publicized by Wachovia officers and
directors." Now imagine that the hypothetical Jane Greene and six of
her friends are watching the news when the reporter relays the
information contained in a Wachovia press release-the same press
release as the one relied upon by Browne and his co-plaintiffs. 90
Though they had not been intending to buy any Wachovia stock, the
press release makes Greene and her six friends optimistic that
Wachovia is doing well financially, and as a result, they call their
respective brokers and purchase shares of stock. In 2008, the reality
of Wachovia's poor financial condition is made public, and
consequently, the corporation's stock plummets to less than twenty
percent of its original value for Browne, Greene, and all of their
friends."
In North Carolina, Greene and her friends would have individual
causes of action against the corporation because they were "actual
purchasers" of the stock under SEC Rule 10b-5.92 Yet Browne and his
co-plaintiffs are left with no individual remedy in North Carolina
despite the fact that they-just like Greene and her friends-were
induced to change their intended course of action by Wachovia's
misrepresentation and suffered equal financial detriment as a result.
The logic of the Mercadante case highlights how arbitrary it is for
North Carolina and many other states to allow the hypothetical
Greene plaintiffs to recover their losses but to prevent individuals like
Browne and his co-plaintiffs from doing the same.
In the decades since Mercadante laid the foundation for holder
claims and articulated the rationale behind such claims, the field of
securities has gone through much change.93 Still, New York courts
89. See id.
90. For examples of the positive information coming from the Wachovia officers, see
leva M. Augstums, Wachovia Says Golden West Doing OK, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2007,
10:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/23/AR2007
082302016.html ("[CEO1 Thompson told analysts last month that looking ahead one to
two years, 'we're going to be very happy we did this deal.' "); Wachovia Chief Defends
Golden West Merger, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Apr. 12, 2007, 2:00 PM),
("Wachovia Corp.'s
http://www.biziournals.com/triangle/stories/2007/04/09/daily28.html
chief executive officer, Ken Thompson, said he remains confident that the bank's $25
billion purchase last year of Golden West Financial will turn out to be a good deal ... and
that eventually the bank will be rewarded.").
91. See Estate of Browne,_ N.C. App. at _, 727 S.E.2d at 575.
92. See supra Part II.A (discussing the scope of SEC Rule 10b-5).
93. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing broad, controlling federal laws and influential
Supreme Court decisions such as Blue Chips Stamps).
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express support for holder claims based on the Mercadante decision. 94
In addition to holder claims specifically, Mercadante-and its
argument that misrepresentations that detrimentally influence a
plaintiff not to act are equally damaging under the law when
compared with misrepresentations that induce affirmative actionhave been positively cited by New York courts in other contexts. 95
In sum, New York case law demonstrates that holder claims are
not a new phenomenon. In pointing out the similarity of fraudulent
inducement and harm to the plaintiff, Mercadante challenges the
contentions that holder claims should not receive the same judicial
treatment as cases involving the purchase or sale of securities. 6
B.

California
More recently, California courts recognized holder claims but
subjected such claims to particular pleading requirements in its 2003
decision in Small v. Fritz Cos.97 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant corporation's directors substantially over-reported
earnings in financial reports and that she made the decision to retain
her stock because of the information contained in these reports.98
Once the misrepresentations came to light, the value of the
corporation's stock dropped dramatically, and the plaintiff brought

94. See, e.g., Babcock v. Citigroup, Inc., Index No. 602965/04, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
8499, at *7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2005). But see Matana v. Merkin, 13 Civ. 1534, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107557, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) ("[Elven assuming that New
York law would permit a satisfactorily pled holder claim along the lines of that
in Mercadente [sic] to go forward....").
95. See, e.g., Hadden v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 382 N.E.2d 1136, 1137-39 (N.Y.
1978) (involving the issue of whether "plaintiff's misrepresentation as exerted upon
defendant employer was of such a character as to vitiate a waiver of the latter's right to
discharge plaintiff before he retired on a pension" and citing to Mercadante for the
proposition that "rtlhe inaction or refraining from action on the part of the employer ...
effected by such purposeful concealment of material facts was as culpable and actionable
as where fraud induces positive action"); Hiliel v. Motor Haulage Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52,
54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) ("This action is brought for damages resulting from an alleged
fraud. It is claimed that by reason of a forgery committed by an employee of the defendant
in erasing a notation of damage upon a warehouse receipt delivered by him to a customs
broker acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the plaintiffs herein were lulled into a false
sense of security as to the condition of the goods and therefore failed to enforce their
rights ... with the resultant lapse of the statute of limitations. . . . An active concealment

has the same force and effect as a representation positive in form . . . and where it induces
non-action where action would otherwise have been taken it is culpable as a fraud.").
96. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43, 75-78 (presenting arguments against
holder claims receiving the same judicial treatment).
97. 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003).
98. See id. at 1256-58.
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suit.99 Courts in other states, including North Carolina, have
acknowledged and discussed the Small decision."o
Two key aspects of the Small decision are important to discuss
here. First, the Small court found that the rationale undergirding Blue
Chip Stamps did not apply to securities claims brought in state
courts.' The California Supreme Court noted in Small that the Blue
Chip Stamps Court did not intend for concerns of "vexatious"
litigation or "strike" suitsl0 to serve "as justification for a total denial
of relief to defrauded holders; it only reasoned that the federal courts
could deny a forum to wronged shareholders who are not sellers or
buyers without unjust consequences because these stockholders
retained a remedy in state courts."o" By limiting Blue Chip Stamps to
federal courts, the Small court emphasized that the lack of federal
remedy regarding holder claims is not fatal because would-be sellers
can bring such actions in state court if a given state chooses to
recognize holder claims." It is worth noting that the California
Supreme Court decided Small-with its focus on state courts as a
99. Id.
100. See Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2003)
("Assuming that Florida courts would recognize a cause of action in fraud or negligent
misrepresentation for holding claims (and The Court believes they would), The Court also
concludes that Florida courts would require the specificity in allegations of reliance
recently recognized by the Supreme Court of California's [Small] decision .... "); see also
Holmes v. Grubman, 691 S.E.2d 196, 198-200 (Ga. 2010) (stating that "although we have
determined that holder claims should be recognized under Georgia law, we further
conclude that the limitations imposed in other jurisdictions are appropriate," and citing
Small among other cases in the relevant discussion); Dloogatch v. Brincat, 920 N.E.2d
1161, 1167-68 (Ill. App. 2009) (discussing the Small standard and concluding that the
plaintiffs in the case did not meet the standard without definitively ruling on whether or
not such standard should be adopted); id. at 1171-72 (Murphy, P.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("I write separately because I would hold that a 'holder' cause of action
exists in Illinois."). In Harris, the court did not pass judgment on whether the Small
approach was a sound decision, but instead it merely noted that "[tjhe few courts [like the
California Supreme Court in Small] that have recognized holder claims have imposed
strict pleading requirements" and concluded that, even if North Carolina were to allow
holder claims with pleading requirements similar to Small, the plaintiffs in the particular
case would not have satisfied the requirements. See Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS
25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *12 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011).
101. See Small, 65 P.3d at 1261.
102. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
103. Small, 65 P.3d at 1261.
104. See id. ("[T]he high court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps, while recognizing policy
considerations similar to those defendants advance here, did not view those considerations
as justification for a total denial of relief to defrauded holders; it reasoned only that the
federal courts could deny a forum to wronged stockholders who are not sellers or buyers
without unjust consequences because these stockholders retained a remedy in state
courts."). Of course, these claims would be limited by removal of class action claims with
fifty or more plaintiffs per SLUSA. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51, 57.
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forum for securities litigation in certain circumstances-after
Congress enacted PSLRA and SLUSA to limit such claims in federal
court.'o Thus, even though the Small decision construes the intention
of the Blue Chip Stamps Court, it does so in light of the more recent
changes in securities law that have made it more difficult to bring
securities claims in federal court.
The second noteworthy aspect concerns policy. The Small court
provided a compelling policy rationale for allowing holder claims in
limited circumstances.'o The defendants in Small advanced the oftrepeated argument that holder claims should not be allowed because
permitting such claims would overwhelm courts and corporations
with frivolous litigation.10 In response, the court concluded that the
risk of some individuals bringing meritless claims does not justify
foreclosing legal remedies for all, given that some potential plaintiffs
will have genuine claims.os Moreover, the Small court noted other
indirect policy benefits that favor permitting holder claims, such as
California's "interest in preserving a business climate free of fraud
and deceptive practices,"" 9 and the fact that permitting holder claims
expands "substantially the number of persons who can enforce
corporate honesty.""10
Still, because of the risk of non-meritorious claims, the Small
court held that a plaintiff bringing a holder claim must satisfy a
heightened pleading requirement."' The court expanded on this idea
by highlighting the type of information that must be included under
this heightened pleading requirement:
In a holder's action a plaintiff must allege specific reliance on
the defendants' representations: for example, that if the
plaintiff had read a truthful account of the corporation's
financial status the plaintiff would have sold the stock, how
many shares the plaintiff would have sold, and when the sale
would have taken place. The plaintiff must allege actions, as
distinguished from unspoken and unrecorded thoughts and

105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See Small, 65 P.3d at 1263-65.
107. See id. at 1263. The court noted that the "[d]efendants do not argue that a holder's
suit for fraud is intrinsically unjust; instead, they claim that some of those suits will be
nonmeritorious, or frivolous . . . ." Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1264 (internal quotations omitted).
110. Id. at 1264-65.
111. See id. at 1265.
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decisions, that would indicate that the plaintiff actually relied
on the misrepresentations.112
Other courts have favorably cited this language from Small when
discussing which pleadings might satisfy the heightened standard for
holder claims.113 In providing this caveat to its decision to permit
holder claims, the California Supreme Court struck a balance
between the interests of courts and corporations, who want to avoid
frivolous litigation, and the interests of potential plaintiffs harmed by
fraudulent or misleading statements of officers or directors.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ALLOw HOLDER CLAIMS

Presently in North Carolina, no direct recourse is available for
individual shareholders in situations where they are misled into
retaining their stock unless the shareholders fall into one of the
Barger exceptions.114 To provide equal footing for all shareholders
who incur losses due to misrepresentations, North Carolina should
adopt the Small court's approach to holder claims because the
approach is logical and better accounts for competing interests."'
Permitting holder claims while imposing heightened pleading
requirements strikes an appropriate balance between protecting
corporations and courts from a flood of litigation and advancing the
interests of shareholders.1 16 Thus, North Carolina should allow for
shareholders to bring suits against a corporation whose stock they
retained as a consequence of fraud or misrepresentation. However,
such suits should be permitted only if, as in Small, the shareholder can
adequately allege specific reliance on the misrepresentation.117 This
would be accomplished by pleading specific details, such as the
number of shares the holder would have sold absent the
misrepresentation, and by pointing to specific, external actions of the
party making the misrepresentation
to support his or her claim,
18
among other details.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2003);
Holmes v. Grubman, 691 S.E.2d 196, 198-200 (Ga. 2010); Dloogatch v. Brincat, 920
N.E.2d 1161, 1167-68 (Ill. App. 2009).
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
116. See infra Part IV.B-C.
117. See Small, 65 P.3d at 1266.
118. See id. at 1265 (noting that internal thoughts that are not expressed to others are
insufficient to allege specific reliance). Because of the specificity required under Small, it
seems likely that this would largely be a case-by-case analysis, and it is beyond the scope
of this Recent Development to attempt to detail all possible circumstances that may satisfy
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This Part begins by discussing the justifications for including
holder claims among the pursuable causes of action in North Carolina
securities law, highlighting why permitting holder claims would draw
a less arbitrary line for legal remedies than the status quo. After
discussing reasons supporting reform in North Carolina that would
permit holder claims, this Part quells objections by explaining why
inclusion of holder claims adequately balances the interests of
corporations, courts, and shareholders.
A.

Justificationsfor Allowing Holder Claims in North Carolina

Looking back to the reasoning of the Mercadante decision, an
investor who changes his or her investment decisions based on fraud
or misrepresentation suffers the same harm regardless of whether the
fraud or misrepresentation induced the investor to buy stock that
otherwise would not have been purchased or to hold onto stock that
otherwise would have been sold.119 Recall the example comparing
Browne and his co-plaintiffs to the hypothetical Jane Greene and her
friends.'20 Both Browne and Greene changed their investment
behavior because of misrepresentations from the corporation, both
were involved in a financial relationship with the corporation, and
both suffered financial loss based on the misrepresentation. The only
notable difference between Browne and Greene is the starting
point-that is, where the parties were situated in relation to the
corporation when they first heard the misrepresentations. However,
this mere difference in starting point is quite an arbitrary divider for
permitting relief for one group but not the other. From an
overarching perspective, individuals like the hypothetical Jane
Greene suffered harm that is equal to the harm suffered by Browne
and his co-plaintiffs. Thus, there should be an equal opportunity for
remedy.
Of course, extending this remedy exposes courts and
corporations to a greater risk of frivolous litigation. However, this
risk should not justify a blanket ban on all claims of holders.12' As the
this standard. However, the following example is one set of circumstances that may do so.
It seems plausible that a document such as an email from a shareholder to his or her
stockbroker stating that the stockbroker should not execute a previously requested sale of
a specified number of shares in light of positive information the shareholder learned
through the corporation's recent press release would satisfy the heightened pleading
requirements.
119. See supra Part III.A.
120. See supra Part III.A.
121. Cf. Taylor, supra note 25, at 422-23 ("Congress and the courts have eliminated
nearly all holder actions-rather than merely the frivolous ones. These actions prevent
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Small court articulated, it is unfair for the courts to foreclose entirely
a remedy to individuals who have also suffered financial losses from
fraud merely because of the potential for frivolous litigation from
some plaintiffs.1 22 As discussed further in Part IV.B, depriving one
party of a remedy merely because of a fear of non-meritorious claims
of a third party is even less justifiable when considering the
mechanisms-short of the blanket ban on all claims by holders
currently in effect in North Carolina and many other states-that
courts can utilize to reduce the risk of non-meritorious claims.
B.

Impact of the ProposedSolution on Corporationsand Courts

As the United States Supreme Court discussed in Blue Chip
Stamps, the primary concerns with permitting securities-related suits
by would-be purchasers or sellers center on the risk of "vexatious
litigation" and "the potential for nuisance or 'strike' suits" that may
interfere with business operations or result in "abuse of the liberal
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."123
Nonetheless, in light of the already existing federal limitations and
the proposed heightened pleading requirements, these risks would
ideally be mitigated for three reasons.
First, as discussed above, SLUSA and the Dabit decision provide
protections for corporations and courts. 124 Even if North Carolina
permitted holder claims, federal statutes and case law would continue
to limit the power of holder claims in terms of the number, scope, and
impact of such claims. If fifty or more plaintiffs were involved in a
class action holder claim suit, then the suit would be removed to
federal court under SLUSA, where it would then be dismissed
because of the lack of recognition of holder claims under federal
law. 125 The SLUSA and Dabit limitations curb the potential for overly
powerful holder claims and help to alleviate the concerns of
"vexatious litigation" expressed in Blue Chip Stamps.126
Second, the proposed heightened pleading requirements from
Small would limit the number of claims that could be brought.

even the most meritorious claims from being litigated.") (citing Lynn A. Stout, Type I
Error, Type II Error,and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
711 (1996)).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
123. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975).
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. See supra Part II.B.
126. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740. This case was decided in 1975, more than
twenty years before SLUSA or Dabitexisted. See supra Part II.A.
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Because of the high bar set by the Small pleading requirements ,127 it
seems unlikely that courts would be inundated with frivolous
litigation. This is particularly relevant in response to fears of potential
abuse of the discovery process, 1281iceol
since only plaintiffs who overcome
the high pleading bar would be able to engage in discovery.
Relatedly, the proposed heightened pleading requirements respond
to the Blue Chip Stamps Court's concerns regarding the dependence
on "uncorroborated oral testimony" 129 and the North Carolina
Business Court's criticism that holder claims are "of a speculative
nature."3 0 Under the Small approach, speculative allegations are not
enough to satisfy the pleading standard; plaintiffs must prove their
intent to sell through previously expressed statements and observable
actions."3 ' It may seem unlikely at present that an individual North
Carolina shareholder would keep detailed records regarding
motivations for decisions to retain shares. But if this standard were
adopted, it seems plausible that some savvy shareholders may begin
keeping records of such decisions if they find it necessary later to
pursue a holder claim.132
127. See supra text accompanying note 112.
128. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741 (discussing plaintiffs' ability to file meritless
claims in order to engage in "extensive deposition of the defendant's officers and
associates" as well as "extensive discovery of business documents").
129. See id. at 746.
130. Harris v. Wachovia Corp., No. 09 CVS 25270, 2011 WL 1679625, at *12 (N.C. Bus.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2011).
131. See supra text accompanying note 112; see also Doug Winnard, Comment, Know
When to Hold 'Em, Know When to Fold 'Em: The Collapse of the Auction Rate Securities
Market and the Problem of Standing for Securities Holders Under Rule 10b-5, 104 Nw. U.
L. REV. 671, 701 (2010) ("[The Smalll pleading requirements would effectively create a
distinction between 'active holders' and 'passive holders.' Active holders are investors who
can provide both objective evidence of actual reliance on the fraudulent misstatement and
reliable details about the aborted sale. Passive holders, by contrast, are those investors
who cannot produce any objective evidence of their aborted sale.").
132. See Winnard,supra note 131, at 701 (noting that only holders who are "active[ly]"
involved in reviewing the statements of the corporation would be the sort of shareholders
that would benefit from holder claims). For an example of what an investor could do to
show that he or she is a would-be seller, see In re Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-md1919 MJP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113088, at *17-19 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2010). The
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the holder claims of one plaintiff,
Monterey County Investment Pool, noting that it met the Small pleading standard by
stating that
it received and reviewed the 2007 Form 10-K, both directly through its Bloomberg
system and through its advisor, and relied upon such misrepresentations and
concealments in deciding to hold on to its note.... [T]he Court finds that the date
of reading is the same day WaMu made the SEC filing because the County alleges
it would have sold its WaMu note the day the 2007 Form 10-K was filed. It cannot
allege that it would have sold the note prior to having actually read the Form 10-K.
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Finally, permitting holder claims would not result in a broadly
expanded pool of potential plaintiffs. Anyone, even those individuals
with no previous financial relationship with the corporation, can claim
that they are "would-be purchasers."' 3 3 As a result, permitting
"would-be purchasers" to bring claims would lead to a vast increase
in potential plaintiffs. By contrast, holder claims are relevant only for
current shareholders-those individuals who already hold stock in the
corporation and can prove they are would-be sellers.'3 4 This
requirement of a relationship limits the pool of potential plaintiffs to
parties who have a pre-existing connection to the corporation and can
point to specific instances where fraud or misrepresentation
influenced their decision not to sell their shares of that corporation.
C.

Impact of the ProposedSolution on Shareholders

While the protections discussed above would ensure that
corporations and courts do not face a flood of litigation, permitting
holder claims would provide two key benefits for shareholders. First,
permitting holder claims provides a previously non-existent remedy
for some defrauded shareholders. Admittedly, as discussed in the
preceding section, the number of shareholders impacted may be fairly
low.135 However, the goal of permitting holder claims is not to allow a
new cause of action for every single shareholder but instead to
expand slightly the possible causes of action available to certain
defrauded shareholders who currently have no judicial recourse.
Second, aside from the direct benefit of providing an additional
legal remedy for certain shareholders, permitting holder claims may
have the indirect benefit of encouraging officers and directors to carry
The County provides a detailed statement that had it read an accurate disclosure
from WaMu in the 2007 Form 10-K it would have sold all of its interest in the
WaMu on the date the filing was made. The County makes the same allegations as
to the 2007 Form 10-K/A. These allegations are adequate under Small.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747 ("[B]ystanders to the securities marketing
process could await developments on the sidelines without risk.").
134. See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1266 (Cal. 2003).
135. To clarify the limited impact that the addition of a holder claim remedy may have,
it is worth noting that the North Carolina Business Court in Browne discussed the Small
approach and stated that "even if North Carolina were to recognize [holder] claims in
limited discrete and narrow fact situations that are specifically and factually pled" like the
approach from Small, "the allegations in the Complaint in this civil action as a matter of
law are insufficient to meet such a standard." Browne v. Thompson, No. 09 CVS 8588,
2011 WL 1675000, at *5 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011). Of course, this is not to say that the
relevant factual circumstances necessarily existed in Browne, just that the plaintiffs did not
plead them sufficiently if such circumstances did exist.

1010

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

out their duties in good faith. As the Small court noted, "[d]enying a
cause of action to persons who hold stock in reliance upon corporate
misrepresentations reduces substantially the number of persons who
1 36
can enforce corporate honesty."
The addition of holder claims
would increase the number of individuals who could hold corporate
actors accountable and, by extension, perhaps dissuade corporations
from fraud along the lines that Wachovia's officers and directors
committed in Estate of Browne.' Shareholders who are able to bring
suits individually-and thus reap financial benefit directly rather than
only in a derivative capacity-would have a greater motivation to
bring suits and thus a greater motivation to personally monitor the
actions of the officers and directors to ensure that they are not acting
fraudulently.13 8
Securities litigation brought by private parties "is important not
only as an ex post remedy for compensating shareholders and
enforcing securities laws, but also as a means of deterring companies
from engaging in fraudulent and illegal behavior."139 This argument is
based on the idea that "those who commit white-collar crimes, such as
securities fraud, act as rational, cost-benefit calculators." 40 Under this
logic, if holder claims are permitted, the additional risk of suit would
factor into a director's or officer's decision regarding whether it was
financially sensible to continue with the securities fraud.

136. Small, 65 P.3d at 1264-65.
137. See Estate of Browne v. Thompson,

-

N.C. App

__

727 S.E.2d 573, 574-75

(2012) ("Plaintiffs contend that the individual defendants concealed information regarding
underwriting standards, collateral quality, and necessary reserves for loans. Plaintiffs
further contend that defendants issued false public SEC filings, press releases, and
earnings calls regarding Wachovia's financial strength and stability . . . .").
138. See ANTHONY OGUS, COSTS AND CAUTIONARY TALES: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS

FOR THE LAW 108-09 (2006). Ogus notes that "civil law claimants typically gain personally
from the remedy, notably damages, which the law confers on them and the 'carrot' may
render them more diligent enforcers. Of course, for such an incentive to be operative, the
benefits, financial and non-financial must exceed the costs of making legal claims ..... Id.
In the context of securities litigation, if a shareholder is able to proceed only
derivatively-and thus would likely receive less financial gain from a successful suit when
compared with someone who proceeds directly given that any damages award would first
go back to the corporation before potentially being passed along to the shareholders (in
much smaller quantities)-the potential financial benefits of bringing suit might not
sufficiently off-set the expense of bringing suit, which, under Ogus's view, seems to negate
the incentive for "diligent enforce[ment]." Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 6365 (discussing derivative actions).
139. Taylor, supra note 25, at 426; see also THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC

APPROACH TO LAW 288-90 (2004) (discussing how incentives can be used to make the
law more efficient).
140. Taylor, supranote 25, at 426
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CONCLUSION

Estate of Browne v. Thompson involved seven Wachovia

shareholders who retained stock after relying on misrepresentations
regarding the financial stability of a failing company-but who were
not provided with the same legal remedy available as actual buyers or
sellers who suffered similar harms from the same misrepresentations.
This decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals highlights the
inadequate relief provided under North Carolina law-namely the
lack of judicial avenues for investors who retained securities that they
otherwise would have sold because of fraud or misrepresentation.
Though policy reasons exist for not wanting to open the courts to
shareholders in such cases, California has adopted a model that
balances such policy concerns with the concerns of the shareholders.
Thus, the balance struck in California in Small-and its added
benefits for shareholders with accompanying safeguards against
unnecessary burdens on courts and corporations-seems fair and
logical in this regard and therefore should be adopted in North
Carolina. Specifically, permitting holder claims would allow holders
or would-be sellers of stock-a class of individuals who currently have
no individual remedy in North Carolina-to pursue an individual
cause of action against directors or officers who make
misrepresentations that the shareholders rely on in retaining their
stock. If North Carolina were to apply the Small standard in
permitting holder claims, the possibility of added burdens on courts
and corporations in the form of frivolous, non-meritorious litigation
would be minimized.
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